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ABSTRACT 
 YU, WEI   How to Maximize the Profit for Bidder and Seller in a Sealed-Bid   
 Second-Price Auction. Department of Economics, June 2013. 
 ADVISOR: Ren, Yufei 
 With a history of more than 2500 years, auctions have long been used to negotiate the 
exchange of goods and commodities. In an auction, bidders compete with rivals by submitting 
bids depending on their personal evaluations of the goods. The good is allocated to the bidder 
who offers the highest bid. There are many different types of auctions, but four major ones are 
primarily concerned by economists and researchers--the English auction, the Dutch auction, the 
sealed-bid first-price auction and the sealed-bid second-price auction. My thesis mainly focuses 
on the characteristics of the sealed-bid second-price auction, with both continuous and discrete 
bidding. My thesis discusses the bidder's strategies that can maximum the expected payoff and 
the seller's strategy that can affect the expected revenue. 
 In continuous bidding, truthful bidding is the dominant strategy. In terms of the discrete 
bidding, my thesis applies the model from Yu (1999) to specifically discuss the sealed-bid 
second-price auction and finds out equilibrium strategy using the expected payoff function from 
buyers. My thesis discusses the trade-off between the winning probability and expected payoff 
for buyers and gives out suggestion on bidding based on individual's risk preference. Also, my 
thesis discusses the expected revenue function for sellers and the factors affecting the expected 
revenue. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
A. A Brief Review of Auction 
 The word "auction" is derived from the Latin augeō which means "I increase" or "I 
augment."1 The record of auction can be retrospect to early 500 B.C. where the women were 
arranged for their marriage. During the Romans period, auctions were used to liquidate the assets 
of debtors whose property had been confiscated. Nowadays, the main function of the auction is 
allocating and exchanging goods and services.  
 Most of the common auctions consist of one seller selling one or more goods and numbers 
of interested bidders. Bidders compete with their rivals by submitting personal bids depending on 
their personal valuations for the goods. The good is allocated to the bidder who offers the highest 
bid. However, the actual price paid by the winner does not always equal the highest bid, but 
depends on the auction type.  
 In regular market, sellers usually set prices of the good or service to be worthy of its 
property. However, sellers in auction seek the buyer whose personal valuation of the good or the 
service to be the highest. Therefore, though auctions do sell normal goods, they put more 
attention on art works, antiques, jewelries and other precious goods in which their values vary a 
lot among bidders. The auction can get a larger profit in the process of accepting increasingly 
higher biddings. Nowadays, bias of the auction market and regular market has been changed due 
                                                
1 Krishna, 2002: p2 
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to the development of the internet, which has led to a significant rise for the range of available 
buyers and categories of goods. The auction industry had a rapid growth recently. In 2008, the 
National Auctioneers Association reported that the gross revenue of the auction industry in the 
U.S. was approximately $268.4 billion. Nowadays, suctions have been applied in a wide range in 
society. The world's most famous wine auction, known as Hospice de Beaune, greatly promoted 
the reputation and the sale of famous wines. For example, France's former first lady, Carla Bruni, 
acted as the guest auctioneer in 2012 and a Ukranian businessman offered Bruni and Sarkozy a 
bidding up to $350,000.The U.S. government also has treasury auction department for short and 
medium term government bonds. Even for online games, such as World of Warcraft, the game 
publisher Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. applies auction system to balance with monetary system 
within the game. Moreover, the E-commerce applies online auction system such as the internet 
auction site eBay. 
 Theoretically, researchers treat the auction as an incomplete information game. The 
exchange of good and the determination of price can be relatively easy to deal with due to the 
absence of market intervention. Namely, an auction can be treated as a sealed-single market in 
which the price is not affected by the outside market. Also, auctions can be treated as an 
incomplete information game since a bidder's strategic behavior is greatly affected by the 
information of his competitors' strategies. Hence, the game theory of incomplete information 
plays an important role in dealing with auctions. Applying game theory in auction helps bidders 
find out the optimal strategy for bidding so that they can maximize their profits. 
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B. Discrete Bid Auctions 
 Most of the existing literature about auctions focuses on the situation in which there are no 
restrictions on the bids. Generally speaking, a bidder is allowed to bid any arbitrary amount 
based on his or her valuation for the good. In other words, a bidder's choice is determined by his 
observed information and it is from a continuum of acceptable choices. However, in a real world 
auction, restrictions indeed exist. For example, the discrete nature of currency makes a restriction 
on the bidding choices. Another example would be the English auction in which the auctioneer 
sometimes sets a minimum price to reserve the value of the good, or restricts on the amount in 
which the next bid must be higher from the current bid. Considering the online auction site eBay, 
a bid increment will be imposed to the winner and this is also a form of restriction. 
 Mathematically, those bidding restrictions make the bidding space to be discrete. Compared 
to continuous bidding, even though bidders' valuations to the good are identically and 
independently distributed, they expected revenues may change. Furthermore, with discrete 
bidding space, the sealed-bid second-price auction no longer has a dominant strategy, which is 
the truthful bidding strategy under continuous bidding. This paper will discuss the characteristics 
of discrete bidding as well as the difference for strategic equilibrium between continuous and 
discrete bidding. 
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C. Purpose and Organization  
 My thesis mainly investigates the sealed-bid second-price auction, with discrete biddings. 
Also, my thesis discusses the equilibrium strategy where the profit for the bidder will be 
maximized. Secondly, my thesis applies Chwe's (1989) assumptions and Yu's (1999) model to 
seek an equilibrium strategy for buyers by conducting the expected payoff function. Finally, my 
thesis discusses the expected revenue for sellers and some of the influential factors that could 
affect the expected revenue. 
 Chapter 2 of my thesis is the literature review, which focuses on the games of incomplete 
information, auctions types and the discrete biddings. In Chapter 3, I discuss the literature of the 
sealed-bid second-price auction in continuous bidding space. In Chapter 4, I discuss the model 
for the sealed-bid second-price auction in discrete bidding space. In this case, my thesis discusses 
the expected payoff function for bidders and expected revenue function for sellers. In Chapter 5, 
I make the conclusion for my thesis and applications to the real world. Finally, the appendix 
contains the proofs of my thesis 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Existing Literature 
 
 This chapter reviews the existing literature about auction theory, which includes the game 
theory of incomplete information, auction types, the comparisons between different types of 
auctions and auctions with discrete bidding. The incomplete information game is one of the 
foundations of the auction theory. Also, the advantages and disadvantages among various type of 
auctions draw many attention from the researchers. Lastly, this chapter discusses the theoretical 
works that focus on the discrete bidding. 
 
A. Games of Incomplete Information 
In an auction, information is not fully symmetric among bidders since one can only know his 
own strategic behavior but not others'. We can treat an auction as an incomplete information 
game since the information is asymmetric in the auction. Hence, it is helpful to apply game 
theory of incomplete information to seek the equilibrium strategy in an auction. 
 Harsanyi’s (1967; 1968) studies are considered to be one of the great papers leading the 
modern information economics. Though it mainly focuses on game theory, its economic thought 
plays an important role. Information in reality is usually unevenly distributed and hence a Nash 
equilibrium cannot be easily achieved. Harsanyi (1968) considers the games with incomplete 
information where players lack some important parameters such as payoff functions, rival's 
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strategic behaviors and so on. The author sets up a new theory analyzing games with incomplete 
information and shows that, under certain assumption, such game can be equivalent to a certain 
game with complete information, called the "Bayes-equivalent" of the original game, or briefly a 
"Bayesian game." This study provides us a new way of achieving equilibrium in the games with 
incomplete information. Harsanyi (1973) also contributes a theorem solving the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. Given that each player's personal information is not transparent to his rivals 
and only know to himself, the mixed strategy equilibrium can be explained as the limit of pure 
strategy equilibrium for a disturbed game of incomplete information. As approaches to the limit, 
the player's strategies converge to the predicted Nash equilibrium, which is equivalent to the 
equilibrium in the complete information game. Harsanyi (1968) provides us a fundamental 
support to find out the equilibrium in an auction game, which is considered as an incomplete 
information game. Harsanyi (1973) theory helps us to find out the equilibrium strategy in an 
auction game in which the bidders' strategies are mixed. 
 Akerlof (1970) discusses the information asymmetry between the seller and the buyer, and 
its influence to the market. The author uses the market for used cars as an example to illustrate 
the problem of quality uncertainty. The author points out that the asymmetric information 
provides the incentive for the seller to pass off low-quality goods as higher-quality ones and the 
buyer prefers to consider the average quality of the goods. This phenomenon is sometimes 
categorized as "the bad driving out the good" in the market. Therefore, such asymmetric 
information gives great influence on the market efficiency. Consider the auction market in which 
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the English auction has transparent information but sealed-bid auctions have asymmetric 
information, Akerlof's thought infers a great difference among auction types. The transparency 
of information certainly affects the efficiency of the auction market. In my study, I assume that 
each bidder only knows his or her own strategic behavior so that there is no second-thinker in the 
game. The result will be entirely different if all bidders know their rivals' strategic behaviors. 
 
B. Auction Types and Comparisons 
 The institutional rule is the main factor to categorize auctions and it also has great influence 
on the bidding incentives, which has been mentioned by Vickrey (1961), of the bidders. There 
are many different types of auctions, but four major ones are primarily concerned by economists 
and researchers. 
 The first type of auction is called the English Auction, which is also known as the open 
ascending price auction. Bidders compete with rivals openly with each subsequent bid to be 
higher than the previous one. The good is allocated to the highest bidder and the price paid 
equals to the highest bid. Sometimes the seller will set a minimum price as a reserve price, and 
sometimes the seller will set a minimum amount requiring that the next bid much exceed such 
amount to the current bid. The most significant feature of English auction is that the current 
highest bid is always open to any potential bidders. This type of auction is arguably the most 
common form of auction in use today. 
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 The second type of auction is called the Dutch Auction, which is also known as the open 
descending price auction. The auctioneer begins with a ceiling price and gradually lower it until 
some bidders are willing to accept. The good is allocated to the bidder who first accepts the price 
and the paid price is the last announced one. This type of auction is convenient when it is 
important to auction goods quickly, since a sale never requires more than one bid. 
 The third type of auction is called the Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction, which is also known 
as the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). Bidders submit their personal sealed bids 
simultaneously without know others bidding information. The good is allocated to the highest 
bidder and the price paid equals the amount he or she submitted. Different from the English 
auction, bidders can only submit one bid. Also, the information is intransparent where bidders 
cannot change their bids according to their rivals' bids. This kind of auction is commonly used 
for government contracts and mining leases.  
 The fourth type of auction is called the Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction, which is also 
known as the Vickrey auction. This auction is invented by Vickrey (1961) and named after him. 
Compared to the sealed-bid first-price auction, this is identical except the paid price by the 
winner equals to the second highest bid instead of the highest one. One example for this auction 
type would be the internet auction site eBay in which the auction system is almost identical to 
the sealed-bid second-price auction but an extra bidding increment. Besides these four major 
types, there are many secondary auction types such as all-pay auction, payout auction and so on. 
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 There are indeed advantages and disadvantages for each of the four major types of auctions. 
The expected revenue, for example, is one of the most important factors that concerned by the 
sellers. Which kind of auction could offer the highest expected revenue so that it is the most 
favorable one to the sellers? It is surprising that, in a continuous auction, all four types of auction 
have the identical expected revenue for the seller. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, 
independence of private valuations and symmetry among bidders, Riley and Samuelson (1981) 
and Myerson (1981) show that all four types of auction will have the same expected revenue for 
the seller. Though this result is restricted in the equilibrium where the incentives to participate in 
the auction do not change, the four types of auction would be equivalent to the sellers in terms of 
expected revenue. Since the auction types are identical, in terms of the expected revenue, to the 
sellers, theoretical works put more attention on the expected payoff of the bidders as well as their 
strategic behaviors. 
 In reality, however, those mentioned assumptions--risk neutrality, independence of private 
valuations and symmetry among bidders-- may not be fulfilled. For example, in the case of 
natural resource auction, the assumption of independence of valuations fails. Therefore, a more 
general version of assumption requires the value of the good to bidders to be identical and the 
distribution function for each bidder's valuation is unbiased. Milgrom and Weber (1982) find out 
that the expected revenue is no longer identical among four types: the English auction provides a 
higher expected revenue than sealed-bid auction. Moreover, when the assumption changes again 
where the risk neutrality becomes risk aversion, expected revenue becomes higher in the 
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sealed-bid auctions. This result explains the fact that sealed-bid auctions are commonly used in 
offshore oil leases auctions because people in the auction are tend to be risk averse.  
 Compared to the English auction and the Dutch auction, researchers put more attentions on 
sealed-bid auctions nowadays. The Vickrey auction, which is also known as the sealed-bid 
second-price auction, has been first described in Vickrey (1961). Vickrey considers an auction 
where there is only one indivisible good is being sold and the paid price by the winner equals to 
the second highest bid. He finds that truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each bidder 
regardless of bidders' risk attitudes. Since bidders in a Vickrey auction are likely to bid on their 
true valuations on the good, it is quite welcome by the sellers. For example, eBay's proxy 
bidding system is almost identical to the Vickrey auction except there is a bidding increment for 
each winner. Also, Google's and Yahoo!'s online advertisement system apply the Vickrey 
auction. Despite the strengths of Vickrey auction, it still has some shortages. Suppose, for 
example, bidders know the valuations of their rivals, they could lower their bid while preserving 
to win the good. Moreover, if the bidding level of bidders is restricted to a discrete bidding space, 
truthful bidding may not be a dominant strategy anymore. 
 
C. Discrete Bidding. 
 Most of the existing theoretical works on auctions focus exclusively on the situation 
assuming there is no restrictions on the bid levels. This means that a bidder can bid any arbitrary 
amount on the good based on his personal valuation and observed information about his rivals. 
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However, restrictions on bids often exist in the real world. For example, the discrete nature of 
currency makes the acceptable bid levels restricted. The minimum amount of currency one can 
hold is, let us say, one cent. It is implausible for a bidder to bid lower than such amount. Also, 
for example, in an English auction, the seller sometimes sets a minimum price to preserve the 
value of the good, which is also a restriction on bids. Another example would be eBay, where the 
winner pays an extra bidding increment varies between five cents and one hundred dollars beside 
the bidding price. Therefore, restricted bidding deserves more attention because it reflects the 
reality.  
 Vickrey (1962) illustrates the situation in which each bidder only has two distinct bid levels. 
Under this assumption, the expected revenue for sellers are no longer identical among four types 
of auctions. Like Milgrom and Weber's (1982) result, the English auction has a higher expected 
revenue than that of the second-price auction. Though this kind of discrete bidding space is 
simple and unrealistic, it still gives us some hint about the difference by changing the continuous 
bidding space into a discrete one. In reality, the situation in which there are only two bid levels 
indeed exists. The Chinese government offers the contract for building a highway and the price is 
fixed as default. Bidder can only choose to accept or decline the offer. However, such case is 
relatively rare in reality. Hence, my thesis applies the model in which there are multiple of bid 
levels. 
 Chwe (1989) focuses on the sealed-bid first-price auction with discrete bidding where there 
are n bidders, each with an independent private valuation function and each bidder's valuation is 
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continuously distributed. The authors brings out the thought about "evenly spaced" discrete bid 
levels from a set M = {b!, b!,… , b!} such that b! = !!!! . Based on the fact that overbidding is 
the dominant strategy in the sealed-bid first-price bidding, Chwe (1989) puts another bid b!!! = !!! !!! = 1 to make the maximum bid equals to the highest possible bidder valuation. 
He shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy and converges 
to the equilibrium of the continuous bidding auction when M approaches infinity. (i.e. the bid 
increment goes to 0) The authors argues that such auction has less revenue than the continuous 
bid auction but converges to the revenue in continuous bid auction. In reality, such evenly spaced 
bidding space is widely existing. In English auction and Dutch auction, the sellers usually 
increase or decrease the bid level by a certain amount, which makes the bidding space evenly 
distributed. In my thesis, the model applies the assumption that the bidding space is evenly 
distributed in order to mimic the real world situation. 
 Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) apply discrete bidding to an English auction. Quite 
interestingly, with discrete bid, an English auction is no longer strategically equivalent to a 
sealed-bid second-price auction where these two are equivalent with continuous bidding. The 
authors assume there are n bidders, each with an independent private valuation and m+1 discrete 
bidding levels. Under the situation where the bidder valuations are uniformly distributed, 
expected revenue of the seller can achieved at the cost of decreasing the expected difference 
between the highest bidder valuation and the valuation of the winner (which is also called the 
expected economic inefficiency). Also, the equilibrium is dynamic based on the number of 
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bidders and distribution of bidders' valuation functions. Those factors influencing the 
equilibrium provides a clue in my thesis about the determinant for the expected revenue for 
sellers. For example, the number of bidders indeed affects the expected revenue for sellers. 
 Yu (1999) applies Chwe's (1989) assumption about "evenly spaced" discrete values to 
examine each of the four primary auction types. Yu (1999) assumes that the valuations of the n 
bidders are independent from a common distribution function F(v) such that F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 
1. In her paper, each type of the auctions has a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. However, 
under such assumption, the truthful bidding is no longer the dominant strategy compared to 
overbidding and underbidding. This means some bidders will bid above their true valuation and 
some will bid below. Such phenomenon will lead to a market inefficiency. Also, Yu finds out 
that as the bidding increment goes to 0 (M goes to infinity), equilibrium converges to the 
equilibrium in continuous bid auction. Yu also assumes that the minimum bid level equals to 0 
and the maximum bid level equals to 1. My thesis applies Yu's assumption because such 
assumptions simplify the model in terms of calculating the expected payoff for bidders. 
 Nowadays, online auctions often apply the discrete bidding space. Hence, researchers are 
trying to provide practical guidance as to how an auctioneer should determine the number and 
value of these discrete bid levels. David el at (2005) aim to provide the optimal auction design 
for an English auction with discrete bid levels. The author describe the discrete bidding space 
and to the end, derive an expression for the expected revenue of the seller. The expression is a 
function contains the actual discrete bid levels implemented, the number of bidders participating, 
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and the distribution from which the bidders draw their private independent valuations. 
Specifically, comparing with previous theoretical work, the authors apply a uniform distribution 
to test their solutions. To conclude, the optimal bid levels result in improvements in the revenue, 
duration and allocative efficiency of the auction. 
 It is also worthy to mention another branch of discrete bidding in the literature. There is a 
phenomenon called “jump bidding” in ascending English auctions where bidders sometimes bid 
higher than what is necessary to be the current highest bidder. For example, Isaac et.al.(2007), 
Easley and Tenorio (2004) examine an auction form of open out-cry in English auctions. They 
also apply discrete bidding spaces that have special bidding restrictions. Such "jump bidding" 
discusses a case in which bidders have incentive to bid above his or her true value for the good. 
My study also mentions this phenomenon, which is correlated with the trade of between winning 
probability and expected payoff. 
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Chapter 3 
The Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction with Continuous 
Bidding 
 
 In this chapter, we discuss the sealed-bid second-price auction in which its bidding space is 
continuous and there is only one single, indivisible good is being sold. The sealed-bid 
second-price auction is also known as the Vickrey auction that was initially described by 
Professor William Vickrey in 1961. The sealed-bid second-price auction provides bidders an 
incentive to bid on their true value. In other word, truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for 
every bidders. 
 To claim that truthful bidding is the dominant strategy, we provide the following statement. 
Statement: 
 The dominant strategy in a sealed-bid second-price auction with continuous biddings for a 
single, indivisible good is for each bidder to bid on his or her true value of the good. 
 
Proof for the statement:2 
 Let iv  be bidder 'i s value for the good. Let ib  be bidder 'i s bid for the good. The payoff 
π  for bidder i  is 
max     if max
=
0                   otherwise     
i j i jj i j i
v b b b
π ≠ ≠
− >⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
 
                                                
2 Similar proof can be found at Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981)  
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 Now we are going to discuss that truthful bidding has a higher expected payoff than either 
overbidding and underbidding. 
 
Case 1: Overbidding 
 Assume that bidder i  bids i ib v> , which means bidder 'i s bid exceed his value of the 
good. 
 If maxi jj iv b≠> , then the bidder i  will win the good since maxi i jj ib v b≠> >  with 
overbidding. Under the circumstance of a truthful bid where i ib v= , the bidder i  still wins the 
good since maxi i jj ib v b≠= > . The payoff of bidder i  is independent of ib  so that these two 
strategies have equal payoffs in this case. 
 If maxi jj ib b≠< , then the bidder i  will lose the good, both in overbidding and truthful 
bidding. They payoffs of both strategies will equally be 0. 
 If maxi j ij iv b b≠< < , then the bidder i  will win the good under overbidding but with a 
negative payoff since max 0i jj iv bπ ≠= − < . Under truthful bidding, the bidder i  will lose the 
good since maxi i jj iv b b≠= <  and hence the payoff is 0.  
 To conclude, the strategy of overbidding is dominated by the strategy of truthful bidding in 
terms of the payoff function. 
Case 2: Underbidding 
 Assume that bidder i  bids i ib v< , which means his bid is less than his value of the good. 
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 If maxi jj iv b≠< , then the bidder i  will lose the good since maxi i jj ib v b≠< < . Under truthful 
bidding, the bidder will also lose the good since maxi i jj ib v b≠= < . These two strategies offer the 
same payoff to be 0 in this case. 
 If max j ij i b b≠ < , then the bidder i  will win the good either in underbidding or truthful 
bidding since his bid is the highest. Again, the payoff of bidder i  is independent of ib  so that 
these two strategies have equal payoffs in this case. 
 If maxi j ij ib b v≠< < , then the bidder i  will lose the good in underbidding and his payoff will 
be 0. However, under truthful bidding, the bidder i  will win the good since max j i ij i b v b≠ < = . 
Also they payoff max 0i jj iv bπ ≠= − >  is positive. 
 To conclude, the strategy of underbidding is dominated by the strategy of truthful bidding. 
 
 In both cases, truthful bidding dominates the other possible strategy. Therefore, in the 
seal-bid second-price auction with continuous bidding, truthful bidding is an optimal strategy.    
                                                                            ■ 
 To conclude in this case, the sealed-bid second-price auction is efficient since it provides 
incentive for bidders to bid on their true value of the good. In terms of the bidder, bidding on 
their true value grant them a non-negative payoff. This is because, by bidding on true value of 
the good, the bidder will either win the good getting a non-negative payoff, or lose the good 
getting a zero payoff. In terms of the seller, the truthful bidding strategy offers the sellers highest 
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expected revenue. These results have been showed in Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson 
(1981). 
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Chapter 4 
Model for Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction with 
Discrete Bid 
 
 In this chapter, we will introduce the model describing the sealed-bid second-price auction 
with discrete bidding space. In part A, we will introduce the basic set up of the model, including 
the assumptions, the basic structure and notations for the model. In part B, we will discuss the 
strategic behavior for a bidder, given his valuation of the good. In part C, we give out a 
fundamental concept about the equilibrium point in bidding levels, which is important in the 
following part. In part D, we apply the expected payoff function for bidders to discuss the 
equilibrium strategies. In part E, we discuss the expected revenue for sellers. 
 
A. The Basic Set up of the Model for Sealed-Bid Second-Price 
Auction with Discrete Bidding 
 
 There are researchers who have built models for sealed-bid second-price auction have been 
studied by several researchers, such as Vickrey (1961), Chwe (1989) and Yu (1999). In my thesis, 
we are inspired by Chwe's (1989) assumptions and manipulate Yu's (1999) model for the 
sealed-bid second-price auction. The actual set up for the model is described as follows.  
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 This model discusses an auction in which the seller auctions an object to N bidders. Each 
bidder's value of the object is distributed independently with [ , ] [0,1]i L Hv v v∈ = , with 
cumulative continuous distribution function ( )F v  such that (0) 0F =  and (1) 1F = . Each 
bidder only knows his own value of the object and bids ib  from a set containing M+1 discrete 
bid levels 1 2 1{ , ,..., }MB b b b +=  where 
1
i
ib
M
−
= . Assume that3 1 0b =  and 1 1Mb + ≤ . This means 
the bid possibilities are multiples of the increment 1
M
. Follow the requirement of the seal-bid 
second-price auction, the highest bidder receives the good paying a price equal to the second 
highest bid. If more than one bidders bid the same highest ib , then randomly and fairly select 
one of them to receive the good. 
 
B. The Strategic Behavior for Bidders 
 
 Here we are going to discuss the strategic behavior for an arbitrary bidder given his or her 
personal value for the good. The strategic behavior in auction markets describes the preference 
of bidding for a certain bidder. 
 Suppose there are finite number of discrete bid levels. There exists at least an acceptable bid 
level. This following Proposition 1 is inspired from Mathews' (2008) Proposition 1. 
  
Proposition 1: 
                                                
3 This follows Chwe's (1989) and Yu's (1999) assumptions. 
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 Consider an arbitrary acceptable bid level jb . For bidder i  whose value i jv b≤ , bidding 
jb  weakly dominates bidding above jb ; for bidder i  whose value i jv b≥ , bidding jb  
weakly dominates bidding below jb . 
 
 Consider a bidder whose value 1( , )i j jv b b−∈ . Proposition 1 implies that all bids other than 
1jb −  and jb  are weakly dominated. From Proposition 1, we have 
(1) A bidder with i jv b≥  will have higher payoff from bidding jb  than from bid levels below 
jb . 
(2) A bidder with i jv b≤  will have higher payoff from bidding jb  than from bid levels above 
jb . 
 Proposition 1 has restricted the plausible bid levels to 1jb −  and jb , given that the value for 
a bidder 1( , )i j jv b b−∈ . This helps us to narrow down the range of bid levels that are could be 
discussed. 
 
 
  
C. Equilibrium Point in Bidding Levels 
 
 In this part, we will discuss that there exists an equilibrium point, or so-called the 
"mid-point", between any two consecutive bid levels 1jb −  and jb  that it is identical to bid on 
1jb −  or jb  in terms of the expected payoff for bidders. 
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 First consider bidder i  with 1( , )i j jv b b−∈  from bidding either 1jb −  or jb . Let a two-tuple 
( , )i jE v bπ  denote the expected payoff for bidder i , where iv  is bidder i 's value of the good 
and jb  is the bid he offers. The expected payoff for bidder i  from bidding jb  is 
                     
1
1 2
1( , ) ( ) ( )
j N
i j i t t i j j
t k
E v b v b p v b p
k
π
−
= =
= − + −∑ ∑                   (3.1) 
where k  stands for the number of bidders who bid on jb  and ip  is the conditional 
probability that the second highest bid equals to jb . 
 The description for the expected payoff function is as follows. The two-tuple ( , )i jE v bπ  
represents the expected payoff for a bidder whose value for the good is iv  and bids on jb . 
Recall that in the sealed-bid second-price auction, the actual paid price equals to the second 
highest bid instead of the highest one. Then the first term of the equation (1), 
1
1
( )
j
i t t
t
v b p
−
=
−∑ , 
describes the expected payoff in which the second highest bid is less than jb . The second term 
of the equation (1), 
2
1( )
N
i j j
k
v b p
k=
−∑ , indicates the situation in which there are more than one 
bidders bid on the highest bid jb . In this case, the winner is chosen randomly and fairly. 
 For the sake of simplifying the question, we first look 2N = . So the expected payoff 
function would be  
                     
1
1
1( , ) ( ) ( )
2
j
i j i t t i j j
t
E v b v b p v b pπ
−
=
= − + −∑                    (3.2) 
 
 The difference between the expected payoff from bidding 1jb −  and jb  is  
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                   1 1 1
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
2 2i j i j i j j i j j
E v b E v b v b p v b pπ π − − −− = − + −           (3.3) 
 
 Consider the situation 0i Lv v= = . We have 
1
1
1(0, )
2
j
j t t j j
t
E b b p b pπ
−
=
= − −∑  
and  
2
1 1 1
1
1(0, )
2
j
j t t j j
t
E b b p b pπ
−
− − −
=
= − −∑  
 We have that 
                             1(0, ) (0, )j jE b E bπ π −<                           (3.4) 
 This means that for bidder whose personal value for the good is 0, he would like to bid as 
low as possible. 
 Then we consider the partial derivative of the expected payoff function in terms of iv  
1
1
( , ) 1
2
j
i j
t j
ti
E v b
p p
v
π −
=
∂
= +
∂ ∑  
and  
2 1
1
1 1
1 1
( , ) 1 1
2 2
j j
i j
t j t j
t ti
E v b
p p p p
v
π − −−
− −
= =
∂
= + = −
∂ ∑ ∑  
 Since 0jp > for all j , we have 
                            1
( , ) ( , )i j i j
i i
E v b E v b
v v
π π−∂ ∂<
∂ ∂
                        (3.5) 
 Equation (3.5) tells us that the expected revenue with a higher bidding is more sensitive to 
the change of personal value for the good. 
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 Consider the situation that bidder's value for the good falls exactly on jb , i jv b= . 
Substitute i jv b=  in (3), we get 
1 1 1
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 2j j j j j j j j j j
E b b E b b b b p b b pπ π − − −− = − + − >  
 So we have 
                             1( , ) ( , )j j j jE b b E b bπ π −>                          (3.6) 
 Equation (3.6) illustrates the same property as Proposition 1-(1), which says that a bidder 
with 1i jv b −≥  will have higher payoff from bidding -1jb  than from bid levels below -1jb . 
 
 Similarly, consider 1i jv b −= . Substitute 1i jv b −=  in (3.3), we get 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 2j j j j j j j j j j
E b b E b b b b p b b pπ π− − − − − − −− = − + − <  
 So we have 
                             1 1 1( , ) ( , )j j j jE b b E b bπ π− − −<                       (3.7) 
 Equation (3.7) illustrates the same property as Proposition 1-(2), which says that a bidder 
with 1i jv b −≤  will have higher payoff from bidding -1jb  than from bid levels above -1jb . 
 Now, consider equation (3.6) 1( , ) ( , )j j j jE b b E b bπ π −>  and equation (3.7) 
1 1 1( , ) ( , )j j j jE b b E b bπ π− − −< . Since the expected payoff function is linear, then the 
Intermediate-Value Theorem suggests that there exist an unique 1( , )j j js b b−∈  such that 
1(s , ) (s , )j j j jE b E bπ π− = . To generalize this, let j k= . We have that there exists an unique
1( , )k k ks b b−∈  for all ib B∈ . This is also true for (v , ) (1, )k H k ks b b∈ = . 
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 Here we call such js  to be the equilibrium point between 1jb −  and jb  since it the 
expected payoff for bidding on 1jb −  and jb  are the same, given that bidder's value for the good 
is js . We can treat js  to be the "mid-point"  for the expected payoff between 1jb −  and jb . 
 In Proposition 1, we have shown that bidder i  with 1( , )i j jv b b−∈  will only bid 1jb −  or 
jb  since other bid levels are weakly dominated. Since 1i jv b −> , then bidder i  will get a 
positive payoff by bidding 1jb − . Consider jb , which is greater than iv . In a sealed-bid 
second-price auction, a bidder i  with iv  could still bid jb  because the actual price he pays is 
equal to the second highest price instead of jb . By bidding jb , the bidder i  increases the 
corresponding winning probability by suffering a risk of getting negative payoff. 
 For any bidder with 1( , )i j jv b b−∈ , we know that 1( , )j j js b b−∈  gives a equilibrium point at 
which the expected payoff from bidding 1jb −  and jb  are equal. If 1[ , )i j jv b s−∈ , then bidding 
1jb −  will offer a higher payoff than bidding jb . If ( , ]i j jv s b∈ , then bidding jb  will offer a 
higher payoff than bidding 1jb − . 
 Recall that we assume the set of bid levels contains M+1 discrete points, 
1 2 1{ , ,..., }MB b b b += . Then for any 1( , )j jb b− , there exists a 1( , )j j js b b−∈  such that 
1( , ) ( , )j j jE s b E v bπ π− < . Let 0 1 2{ , , ,..., }rS s s s s=  such that 
0 1 20 ... 1L r Hv s s s s v= = < < < < = =  with 1r M≤ + . 
 Therefore, a bidder i  with 1[ , )i j jv s s−∈  will bid ib  since i jv s< and a bidder with 
i rv s=  will bid rb . Those explanations provide us a clear incentive to construct the expected 
payoff function for bidders in the following part. 
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D. The Equilibrium Strategy in Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction 
 
 In this part, we will construct a function describing the optimal strategy for a bidder in terms 
of his or her expected payoff. Here we first discuss the strategy function for a bidder. 
 A bidder's strategy is a function from [0,1]  to 1 2 1{ , ,..., }MB b b b += returning the bidders 
optimal ib , given the bidder's personal value v of the object. Denote this function as 
1 2 1( ) :[0,1] { , ,..., }Mb v b b b +→ . 
 A bidder's strategy ( )b v  is an equilibrium strategy if it satisfies 
                   1 2 1(v, ) (v, ), b { , ,..., }i j j ME b E b B b b bπ π +≥ ∀ ∈ =                  (4.1)        
and 
                                 (v, ) 0iE bπ ≥                               (4.2) 
 Basically these two inequalities give out the restrictions of being an equilibrium. Namely, 
(4.1) infers that an equilibrium strategy offers the highest expected payoff among all strategies, 
and (4.2) infers that an equilibrium strategy should not let the bidder lose profit. 
 Recall that in a sealed-bid second-price auction, the good is allocated to the bidder who 
offers the highest bid and the actual payment is equal to the second highest bid. Let iP  denote 
the payment that a bidder bidding ib  needs to pay. Denote "the second highest bid" as SHB and 
denote "the highest bid" as HB. We have the expected payoff function for bidding ib : 
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( , ) ( )Prob(  is the HB bidding )i i i iE v b v P b bπ = −  
 The above function literally tells us that the expected payoff is the difference between one's 
personal value to the good and the actual paid price, times the corresponding probability. 
 A game in normal form4 is symmetric if all agents have the same strategy set, and the 
payoff is depends on the given strategy, not on the agents. Hence, an equilibrium strategy in a 
symmetric game is called a symmetric equilibrium strategy. The following four conditions allow 
us to construct the form of the symmetric equilibrium strategy ( )b v  (proofs for condition b, c, d 
can be found in Appendix)5. 
a) (0) 0b =  It is easy to show that, under truthful bidding, a bidder's optimal bid will be 0 
given that his value of the good is 0. 
b) { [0,1] ( ) }i iB v b v b= ∈ ⎮ =  is convex in v. 
c) ( ) 0, [0,1]b v v= ∀ ∈  is not an equilibrium strategy 
d) ( )b v  is monotonically increasing in v. 
 The symmetric equilibrium strategy b(v) we considered will be of the following form: 
                        1
     if [ , s ),1  
( )
     if                       
i i i
r r
b v s i r
b v
b v s
−∈ ≤ ≤⎧= ⎨
=⎩
                     (4.3) 
 where 0 1 2{ , , ,..., }rS s s s s=  is the strategy space for the bidder with 
0 1 20 ... 1L r Hv s s s s v= = < < < < = =  and r  is an integer such that 1 1r M≤ ≤ + . Equation (4.3) 
can be explained into two separate cases. For bidder whose personal value is not as high as 1, 
                                                
4 Adapted from Definition 7.D.2 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) 
5 Conditions b, c, d are the Lemma 1, 2, 3, respectively, in Yu's (1999) page 20. 
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then there exists a closest "mid-point" to the bidder's personal value. In this case, the bidder 
should choose the bid level having the same subscript with that "mid-point". For bidder whose 
personal value is 1, the bidder should just bid 1. We can show that the strategy form (4.3) is a 
symmetric (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.  
 The existence of such pure strategy equilibrium has been discussed in many theoretical 
works. From the Purification Theorem in Milgrom and Weber (1985), there exists a symmetric 
equilibrium strategy in any finite symmetrical strategic-form game. Yu (1999) has discussed that 
all the four major types of auction are symmetrical games and she proved the existence of a 
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.6 
 Recall that the bidding strategy ( )b v  is an equilibrium strategy if equation (4.1) and (4.2) 
are satisfied at the same time. Note that in the sealed-bid second-price auction, the expected 
payoff for any bidder would be greater than 0. Therefore, equation (4.2) will be satisfied. i.e.   
( , ) 0, [0,1]iE v b vπ ≥ ∀ ∈  
 Suppose a bidder bid rb  instead of 1rb + , then it must be either 1(v, ) (v, )r rE b E bπ π +≥  or 
1rb +  is not available. i.e. 1rb =  and 1r M= + . Now we introduce two lemmas
7 that are 
important in later proofs. 
Lemma 18:  
                                                
6 Yu (1999) proved the existence in Proposition 1. 
7 Lemma 1&2 are Lemma 4&5 in Yu (1999) 
8 Proof for Lemma 1 is in Yu (1999) page 55. 
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 Given that 1 2 1(v, ) (v, ), b { , ,..., }i j j ME b E b B b b bπ π +≥ ∀ ∈ = for each 1,2,..., 1i r= − , a bidder 
with value is  is indifferent from bidding ib  and 1ib + . i.e. 1( , ) ( , )i i i iE s b E s bπ π +=  
Lemma 1 is basically follows the definition of 0 1 2{ , , ,..., }rS s s s s= . It tells us that if the 
bidder's personal value falls exactly on some "mid-point," then the expected payoff would be the 
same from bidding above or below that "mid-point." 
Lemma 29:  
                             1( , ) ( , )r r r rE s b E s bπ π +≥                          (4.4) 
for 1 1r M≤ ≤ + , and,  
                             1( , ) ( , )i i i iE s b E s bπ π +=                           (4.5) 
for 1,2,..., 1i r= −  are the only binding constraints. 
 With these two lemmas, we can then determine that the bidding strategy ( )b v  is an 
equilibrium strategy, stated in the following Proposition 2. 
Proposition 210: 
 The bidding strategy ( )b v  of the form (4.3) is an equilibrium strategy if 
1( , ) ( , )r r r rE s b E s bπ π +≥  
for 1 1r M≤ ≤ +  and 
1( , ) ( , )i i i iE s b E s bπ π +=  
for 1,2,..., 1i r= − . 
                                                
9 Proof of Lemma 2 is in Yu (1999) page 55. 
10 Proof of Lemma 2 is in Yu (1999) page 56. 
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 Recall that in the sealed-bid second-price auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid to the 
seller by his own value of the good. The good will be allocated to the bidder who bids the 
highest, and the price he pays equals to the second highest bid. 
 We have the expected payoff function in the following form: 
(v, ) (v )Prob(  is the HB bidding )i i i iE b P b bπ = −  
 Given that the bidder i  wins the good by bidding ib , we need to calculate the value of iP , 
which stands for the actual price the bidder i  needs to pay and is determined by the second 
highest bid among bidders. We can calculate the probability of each ib  to be the second highest 
bid and its corresponding payoff. Then we can get the expected payoff function by summing the 
calculated payoffs. Suppose that in the case of tie, the winner will be chosen randomly and fairly. 
So we expand the expected payoff function as follows: 
               
1 1
2 2
1 1
2
( , ) ( )Prob( 0  HB= )
( )Prob(  HB= )
...
( )Prob(  HB= )
1( ) Prob(t 2 bidders bid  HB= )
i i
i
i i i
N
i i i
t
E v b v b SHB b b
v b SHB b b
v b SHB b b
v b b b
t
π
− −
=
= − = =
+ − =
+
+ − =
+ − ≥∑
           (4.6) 
 Also, we have the expected payoff function for bidding 1ib + : 
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1 1 1 1
2 2 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
2
( , ) ( )Prob( 0  HB= )
( )Prob(  HB= )
...
( )Prob(  HB= )
( )Prob(  HB= )
1( ) Prob(t 2 bidders bid  HB= )
i i
i
i i i
i i i
N
i i i
t
E v b v b SHB b b
v b SHB b b
v b SHB b b
v b SHB b b
v b b b
t
π + +
+
− − +
+
+ + +
=
= − = =
+ − =
+
+ − =
+ − =
+ − ≥∑
        (4.7) 
 Recall from the proposition 1 that ( )b v  is an equilibrium strategy if it satisfies condition 
(4.4): 1( , ) ( , )r r r rE s b E s bπ π +≥  for i r= , and (4.5): 1( , ) ( , )i i i iE s b E s bπ π +=  for 1,2,..., 1i r= −  
are the only binding constraints. Plug (4.6) and (4.7) into condition (4.5), we have that: 
1( )prob(SHB= 0 HB ) ( )prob(SHB= 0 HB )i j j i i j j is b b b s b b b +− = ⎮ = = − = ⎮ =  
for 1,2,..., 1k r= − . 
 Hence, (4.7) - (4.6) will get: 
                  
1 1 1
2
1
2
1( ) Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= )
( ) Prob(SHB HB )
1( ) Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= )
0
N
i i i i
t
i i i i
N
i i i i
t
s b t b b
t
s b b b
s b t b b
t
+ + +
=
+
=
− ≥ ⎮
+ − = ⎮ =
− − ≥ ⎮
=
∑
∑
             (4.8) 
 The reason why we combine equation (4.6) and (4.7) is that we can cancel many similar 
terms based on the fact that the expected payoff by bidding on ib  and 1ib +  are same, given that 
the personal value for the good falls exactly on is . 
     Now we are going to discuss the conditional probability presented in the equation above. 
 For 1 1Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= )i it b b+ +≥ ⎮ . Given that the highest bid is 1ib +  and there are 
12 bidders bid it b +≥ . Then besides the winner, there are 1t −  bidders bidding 1ib +  among 
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1N −  bidders. Since 1 1i i is b s+ +< < , then the probability for those bidders with value 1ib +  
would be ( ) 11( ) ( )
t
i iF s F s
−
+ − . For the rest ( ) ( )1 1N t N t− − − = −  bidders, their bid levels are 
less than is . So the probability is ( )( )
N t
iF s
− . To conclude, we have that 
( ) ( )11 1 1
1
Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
t N t
i i i i i
N
t b b F s F s F s
t
− −
+ + +
−⎛ ⎞
≥ ⎮ = −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
 For 1Prob(SHB HB )i ib b += ⎮ = . Given that the highest bid is 1ib + , then for the rest 1N −  
bidders, their probability is 1( )N iF s
− . Given the second highest bid is ib , then for the rest 
1N −  bidders, their probability is 1 1( )
N
iF s
−
− . Therefore, we have  
1 1
1 1Prob(SHB HB ) ( ) ( )
N N
i i i ib b F s F s
− −
+ −= ⎮ = = −  
 For Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= )i it b b≥ ⎮ . Given that the highest bid is ib  and there are 
2 bidders bid it b≥ . Then besides the winner, there are 1t −  bidders bidding ib  among 1N −  
bidders. Since 1i i is b s− < < , then the probability for those bidders with value ib  would be 
( ) 11( ) ( )
t
i iF s F s
−
−− . For the rest ( ) ( )1 1N t N t− − − = −  bidders, their bid levels are less than 
1is − . So the probability is ( )1( )
N t
iF s
−
− . To conclude, we have that 
( ) ( )11 1
1
Prob( 2 bidders bid HB= ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
t N t
i i i i i
N
t b b F s F s F s
t
− −
− −
−⎛ ⎞
≥ ⎮ = −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
 Substitute these probabilities into equation (8) we get 
                 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
2
1 1
1
1
1 1
2
11( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
11( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
0
N
t N t
i i i i i
t
N N
i i i i
N
t N t
i i i i i
t
N
s b F s F s F s
tt
s b F s F s
N
s b F s F s F s
tt
− −
+ − −
=
− −
−
− −
− −
=
−⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
+ − −
−⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
=
∑
∑
            (4.9) 
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 Equation (4.9) contains the conditional probability so that we can derive an equation based 
on the probability density function. The following steps are the process of solving (4.9). 
 Notice that 
1
1
N N
N
t t
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 and  
0
( )
( )
N N
N
t N t
t
a a b b
N
a b b
t
−
=
= − +
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑  
 We have that  
          
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
2
1 1
0
1 1
1
11
1
1
1
0 1
N
t N t
t
N
t N t
t
N
t N t N N
t
N N N
N N
N
N
a b b
tt
N
a b b
t t
N a b
N N N
a b b b a b b
t t
N a b
a b N a b b
N a b
a b b
N a b
− −
=
−
=
− −
=
−
−
−⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠=
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠=
−
− − −
=
−
−
= −
−
∑
∑
∑  
 Hence, equation (4.8) can be rewritten as 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1
2
1 1
1
1
1 1
2
11
1
1
11( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
11( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
N
t N t
i i i i i
t
N N
i i i i
N
t N t
i i i i i
t
N N
Ni i
i i i
i i
N
i i
N
s b F s F s F s
tt
s b F s F s
N
s b F s F s F s
tt
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
Fs b
− −
+ − −
=
− −
−
− −
− −
=
−+
+
+
−⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
+ − −
−⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−
= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
+ −
∑
∑
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1
1
11
1 1
1
11
1
1
1 1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
N
i i
i i
N N
Ni i
i i i
i i
N N
Ni i
i i i
i i
N N
N i i
i i i
i i
s F s
N F s F s
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
− −
−
−
−−
+ −
−
−+
+
+
− −
−
⎛ ⎞−
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−
− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−
= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ −
+ − −
−
0
⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
=
      (4.10) 
 From Yu (1999)11, we have the following Lemma 3 and the proof is in Appendix. 
Lemma 3 
  
( ) ( )
11 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N N N N
Ni i i i
i
i i i i
F s F s F s F sF s
N F s F s N F s F s
−− +
− +
− −
< <
− −
 
 From Lemma 3, we simplify equation (4.9) 
( )
( )
11
1
1
1 1
1
1 1 2
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
N N
Ni i
i i i
i i
N N
N i i
i i i
i i
i i i i
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
F s F ss b F s
N F s F s
s b k s b k
−+
+
+
− −
−
+
⎛ ⎞−
− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−
+ − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
= − + −
 
                                                
11 Yu (1999) page 26 Lemma 6 
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where 1 2, 0k k >  represent the probability of winning. 
 Recall from the definition of is , we have that 1i i ib s b +< < . Therefore, from equation (4.10) 
and Lemma 3, we have the following two conditions 
1) As bidder's value approaches ib , 1k  will increase to fulfill equation (4.9)  
2) As bidder's value approaches 1ib + , 2k  will decrease to fulfill equation (4.9)  
 These two conditions imply the trade-off between the payoff and the probability of winning. 
As bidder's value approaches ib , the bidder submits a lower bid to ensure a positive payoff but 
the corresponding probability of winning decreases. On the other hand, as bidder's value 
approaches 1ib + , the bidder submits a higher bid in which may lead to a negative payoff but the 
corresponding probability of winning increases. Recall that in a sealed-bid second-price auction, 
they actual paid price equals to the second highest bid. Hence, bidding higher than one's personal 
to the good may still lead to a positive payoff. 
 We can also conclude that, unlike the continuous bidding in which the truthful bidding is the 
dominant strategy, there is no dominant strategy in discrete bidding. This is because for 
( )1,i i iv b b +∈ , it is possible for a bidder to choose either ib  or 1ib +  to get a positive payoff, 
shown in equation (4.10). This means both underbidding and overbidding are not weakly 
dominated. In real world, one can choose a strategy of overbidding or underbidding based on his 
or her estimation of probability. For a person who overestimates the probability of winning with 
value iv , he or she might prefer to bid over is  in order to get a higher payoff. On the other 
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hand, a person who overestimates the probability of winning with value iv  might prefer to bid 
below is  to avoid potential risk by giving up some amount of payoff. 
 
E. The Expected Revenue for Sellers 
  
 In the previous section, we have discussed the expected payoff for bidders. The expected 
payoff is the most important thing that bidder cares and the payoff function is related to the 
probability density function, the conditional probability of winning and the number of bidders. In 
this section, we will discuss the most important thing for sellers, which is the expected revenue. 
In a sealed-bid second-price auction, the revenue of the seller equals to the second highest bid. 
Therefore, the expected revenue for seller is determined by the second highest bid level and its 
corresponding probability. Let M  be the probability mass function for each bidder to bid ib . 
Note that the probability mass function M has no direct relationship with the probability density 
function ( )F v  in the last section.  Let EΠ  denote the expected revenue of the seller, then we 
have 
           0 0 1 1 1 1Prob(SHB= ) Prob(SHB= ) ... Prob(SHB= )M ME b b b b b b+ +Π = + + +        (5.1) 
 Same as the previous notations, SHB stands for the second highest bid. 
 Now we are going to discuss the conditional probability. Consider Prob(SHB= )ib , there are 
two cases such that SHB= ib . 
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 Case 1: there is only one bidder bids 1ib b +≥ , one or more bidders bid ib . This means that 
the highest bid is unique and there exists at least one second highest bid. 
 Case 2: two or more bidders bid ib  and no bidder bids 1ib b +≥ . This means that there is a 
tie in the highest bid, in other word, the highest bid equals to the second highest bid. 
 Case 1 describes the situation in which there are k  bidders with valuation in range of 
1[ , )i ib b + , one bidder with valuation in range of 1 1[ , ]i Mb b+ +  and other 1N k− −  bidders with 
valuation in range of 0[ , )ib b . For those k  bidders, the probability is denoted as 
( )1( ) ( )
k
i iM b M b+ − ; for 1N k− −  bidders, the probability is denoted as 
1
1( )
N k
iM b
− −
+ ; for that 
one bidder, the probability is denoted as 11 ( )iM b +− . Hence, the probability of case 1 turns out 
to be  
( ) ( )
1
1
1 1 1
1
1
Prob(case1) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
N
k N k
i i i i
k
N
M b M b M b M b
k
−
− −
+ + +
=
−⎛ ⎞
= − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑  
 Case 2 describes the situation in which there k  bidders with valuation in range of 1[ , )i ib b +  
and other N k−  bidders with valuation in range of 0[ , )ib b . For those k  bidders, the 
probability is denoted as ( )1( ) ( )
k
i iM b M b+ − ; for N k−  bidders, the probability is denoted as 
( )N kiM b
− . Hence, the probability in case 2 is  
( )
1
1 1
2
Prob(case2)= ( ) ( ) ( )
N
k N k
i i i
k
N
M b M b M b
k
−
−
+ +
=
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑  
 Therefore, we can update equation (5.1) by plugging these probabilities as 
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
0
1 1
1
0 1 1 1
0 1
1 1
0 1 1
0 2
Prob(case1)+Prob(case2)
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
M
i
M N
k N k
i i i i
i k
M N
k N k
i i i
i k
E b
N
b M b M b M b M b
k
N
b N M b M b M b
k
+
=
+ −
− −
+ + +
= =
+ −
−
+ +
= =
Π =
⎡ − ⎤⎛ ⎞
= − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
+ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
    (5.2) 
 Equation (5.2) is the updated version of equation (5.1) having the probability mass function. 
 In order to increase the second highest bid, which is equivalent to seller's revenue, the seller 
could make the increment of bidding levels, M , to be smaller so that the second highest bid 
may increase relative to the original one. As M approaches 0, the equilibrium of discrete 
bidding will converge to continuous bidding in which the truthful bidding dominates. Therefore, 
on average, seller would like to provide an incentive for bidder to bid on their true value for the 
good instead of underbidding. Hence, by decreasing the bidding incremental will certainly help 
seller to rise the expected revenue since bidders are more likely to bid on their true value for the 
good. 
 Another important factor that could affect the expected revenue for sellers is the number of 
bidders. In this case,  
E
N
∂
Π > 0
∂
 
 Hence, it is better for seller to call for more bidders to attend the auction. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Application 
 
 In my thesis, I studied the sealed-bid second-price auction with both continuous bidding and 
discrete bidding. In the case where the bidding space is continuous, truthful bidding is the 
dominant strategy for bidders. Bidders prefer to bid on their true value for the good to maximize 
their expected payoff and at the same time, sellers could maximize their expected revenue since 
all bidders will not underbid. In the case where the bidding space is discrete, we discussed the 
expected payoff for bidders and the expected revenue for sellers. Truthful bidding is no longer 
the dominant strategy and bidders will consider the trade-off between expected payoff and 
winning probability. On seller's side, the incremental size and the number of bidders affect the 
expected revenue. Based on these results, we can make changes to those factors to increase the 
expected revenue for sellers. 
 We have shown that there exists a trade-off between the expected payoff and the 
corresponding probability of winning. Bidding lower grants the bidder a lower chance of 
winning but ensure a non-negative expected payoff. Bidding higher enhances the winning 
probability for bidder along with a risk of having negative payoff. The bidders, knowing their 
probability density function, could calculate the equilibrium point is  and compare it to their 
own value for the good, iv . By knowing the relationship between is  and iv , a bidder could 
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maximize his or her expected payoff. In terms of the seller, the seller would always want the 
bidder to overbid.  
 For the expected revenue for sellers, we have discussed that there are two factors affecting it, 
namely the incremental size and the number of bidders. As the incremental size approaches to 
zero, the expected revenue approaches to that of in continuous bidding. The number of bidders 
has positive correlation with the expected revenue. With more bidders attending the auction, the 
sellers earns more expected revenue. In general, for any distribution of the bidders' valuations, 
the expected revenue in discrete bidding space is less than that in the continuous bidding space. 
Such lose in revenue is compensated in time saving and communication cost since the bidding 
procedure is shortened. Hence, if the cost of timing and communication are trivial, for example, 
online auction costs nearly no communication fee and timing for bid up, then it is better to shrink 
the incremental size to increase the expected revenue for sellers. As the bidding increment 
decreases, the expected revenue in discrete bidding would converge to that of in continuous 
bidding. Meanwhile, increasing the number of bidders would certainly compress the room for 
those who want to win the good by offering a relatively lower bid. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Conditions b, c, d are the Lemma 1, 2, 3, respectively, in Yu's (1999) 
page 20. 
 For bidder i , let ( , )i mE v bπ  denote the expected payoff for bidder i  with valuation iv  
from bidding mb . WTS: for a bidder with i jv b≤ , ( , ) ( , )i j i mE v b E v bπ π≥  for every m jb b> ; 
for a bidder with i jv b≥ , ( , ) ( , )i j i mE v b E v bπ π≥  for every m jb b< .  
 Let jp  denote the probability for winner i  bidding jb . The expected payoff function at 
this situation is 
                 
1
1
1( , ) ( ) ( )
m
i m i t t i m m
t
E v b v b p v b p
t
π
−
=
= − + −∑                 (A) 
 
 Consider ( , ) ( , )i m i m kE v b E v bπ π −−          
1
1
1 (( ) ( ) ) ( )
2
m
i m m i m k m k i t t
t m k
v b p v b p v b p
−
− −
= − −
− + − + −∑                                
 
for 2,3,...,k m=  and  
 1 1
1 (( ) ( ) )
2 i m m i m m
v b p v b p− −− + −  
for 1k =  . 
 For bidder i  with i m kv b −≤ , equation (A)≤0. For bidder i  with i mv b≥ , (A)≥0. 
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Proof of (b): { [0,1]  ( ) )i iB v b v b= ∈ =  is convex in v .
12 
 Suppose that 1 2( ) ( ) ib v b v b= =  where 1 2, [0,1]v v ∈ , from the definition of expected payoff 
function, we have 
1 1
1
( , ) ( , ),
( , ) 0
i j j
i
E v b E v b b
E v b
π π
π
≥ ∀⎧
⎨
≥⎩
 
and  
2 2
2
( , ) ( , ),
( , ) 0
i j j
i
E v b E v b b
E v b
π π
π
≥ ∀⎧
⎨
≥⎩
 
Recall the definition of Eπ , we have that  
1 1 ,i i i j i jv P p P v P p P j− ≥ − ∀  
2 2 ,i i i j i jv P p P v P p P j− ≥ − ∀  
 We conclude that  
,i i i j i jvP p P vP p P j− ≥ − ∀  
with ( , ) 0iE v bπ ≥ .                                                            ■ 
 
Proof of (c): 
 Suppose ( ) 0b v =  for all v , then 1( , ( ))E v b v
N
π =  for all v . If some bidder with 
1 ( 0)v
N
ε ε= + >  deviates and bids 
2
ε , he will win the good with probability of 1. We have 
                                                
12 Yu (1999) page 55  
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1 1( , )
2 2
1
2
1
1( ,0)
E
N N
N
N
E
N
ε ε
π ε ε
ε
π ε
+ ≥ + −
= +
>
= +
 
■ 
 
Proof of (d): 
 From (4.1), we have that  
,i i i j i jvP p P vP p P j i− ≥ − ∀ ≠  
 Or 
( ) ,i j i j j jv P P p P p P j i− ≥ − ∀ ≠  
 Hence, for any 'v v> , we have that ( ') ( )b v b v≥                                 ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
( )
1
1
1 2 2 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ) ( )=
N N
i i
i i
N N N N
i i i i i i
F s F s
N F s F s
F s F s F s F s F s F s
N
−
−
− − − −
− − −
−
−
+ + + +
 
 Since 1i is s− < , 1( ) ( )i iF s F s− < . Then 
2 1
1( ) ( ) ( )
N N
i i iF s F s F s
− −
− < ,...,
2 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
N N
i i iF s F s F s
− −
− −< , 
1 1
1( ) ( )
N N
i iF s F s
− −
− < . This implies that  
1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N N N N N
i i i i i i iF s F s F s F s F s F s NF s
− − − − −
− − −+ + + + <  
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and we have  
( )
11
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
N N
Ni i
i
i i
F s F s F s
N F s F s
−−
−
−
<
−
 
 Similarly, we have 
( )
1 1
1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
N N
N i i
i
i i
F s F sF s
N F s F s
− +
+
−
<
−
 
 By combining the results, we have  
( ) ( )
11 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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N N N N
Ni i i i
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i i i i
F s F s F s F sF s
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